Pluralism is a sound strategy in classifying disciplines of biology. The relevance of a particular classification depends on various methodological issues, on the way in which the scientist's problems are specified, and on factual matters.

The overt oviposition rhythm ofLymnaea stagnalis should be regarded as an endogenous one. Despite considerable deviations of its period from 24 hrs, entrainment by 24 hr. external periodicities is possible. Possibly, entrainment is effectuated via a second — covert — internal rhythm. The fact that similar rhythms have not been established before, is probably connected with the nature of the phenomena to which previous studies have generally been limited.

Something is wrong with current discussions about theory reduction. The question of whether higher level theories are reducible to lower level theories cannot be posed in a sensible way if methodological principles that are needed to evaluate scientific theories are disregarded. If this is recognized, the problem looses much of its alleged importance.

Functional explanations are regarded as a special type of explanation by many biologists. Philosophers of science tend to agree that they are weak forms of the common modes of explanation, although the elucidation of the logical structure involved is difficult. The present paper shows that Hempel's reconstruction of functional explanations is inadequate on pragmatic grounds. Thus his conclusion that such explanations are necessarily weak is also objectionable. There is no reason for allotting functional explanations a special logical status.

Pluralism is a sound strategy in classifying disciplines of biology. The relevance of a particular classification depends on various methodological issues, on the way in which the scientist's problems are specified, and on factual matters.

Evolutionary psychology is put forward by its defenders as an extension of evolutionary biology, bringing psychology within the integrated causal chain of the hard sciences. It is extolled as a new paradigm for integrating psychology with the rest of science. We argue that such claims misrepresent the methods and explanations of evolutionary biology, and present a distorted view of the consequences that might be drawn from evolutionary biology for views of human nature. General theses about adaptation in biology are empty (...) schemata, not laws of nature allowing the subsumption of mind under biology. Functional thinking is an indispensable tool for psychology, mostly of value in abstractive unification and as a heuristic, but it gains little from association with evolutionary notions of selection. Thus, we argue, the cherished integrative causal model evaporates, and evolutionary phraseology serves no more than rhetorical purposes. Moreover, the universality of human nature and the evolutionary irrelevance of individual variation are presented as biological truths that psychologists should respect in their approach to mind. On closer inspection, this turns out to be rather dubious biology. Psychology might conceivably be better off as a continuation of biology by different means, but evolutionary psychology does not provide the conceptual integration leading to such a happy union. (shrink)

Legal and moral reasoning share much methodology, and they address similar problems. This volume charts two shared problems: the relation between theory, principles and particular judgments; and the role of facts and factual assertions in normative settings. The relation between 'theory' and 'practice' and between 'principle' and 'particular judgment' has become the subject of much debate in moral philosophy. In the ongoing debate, some moral philosophers refer to legal philosophy for a support of their views on the primacy of 'practice' (...) over 'theory'. According to them, legal philosophy should have a more balanced view in that relation. In the contributions to Part One this claim is critically analysed. The role of the facts is underestimated in discussions on legal reasoning and legal theory, as well as moral reasoning and ethical theory. Factual statements enter into moral and legal discussions not only because they link the conclusion with a rule. They also play a role as background assumptions in supporting a theory. Its focus on the role of facts in normative reasoning makes this book of special interest to scholars of legal and moral argumentation. (shrink)

"[Mitchell] undertakes to explore the nature of images by comparing them with words, or, more precisely, by looking at them from the viewpoint of verbal language.... The most lucid exposition of the subject I have ever read."—Rudolf Arnheim, _Times Literary Supplement_.

W. J. Mander examines the nature of idealist ethics, that is to say, the form and content of ethical belief most typically adopted by philosophical idealists. His inquiry has two aims. The first is historical: from the record of past philosophy, Mander demonstrates that there exists a discernible idealist approach to moral philosophy; a tradition of 'idealist ethics', and examines its characteristic marks and varieties. The second aim is apologetic. He argues that such idealist ethics offers an attractive way of (...) looking at moral questions and that it has much to contribute to contemporary discussion. In particular he argues that Idealist ethics have the power to cut through the sterile opposition between moral realism and moral anti-realism. To be an idealist is precisely to hold that the universe is so constituted that things are real if and only if they are ideal; to hold that uncovering in something the work of mind makes it more not less significant. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Epistemic Value Commitments”W. John Livesley (bio)A disquieting feature of contemporary psychiatric nosology is the tendency to adopt positions that imply that current classifications are simply statements of fact. Clinicians and researchers alike seem to assume that the DSM diagnostic concepts are factual descriptions based only on scientific analysis that reflect the essential nature of psychiatric disorders. The architects of the DSM acknowledge in various ways that this (...) is not the case. Frances et al. (1991), for example, noted the provisional and pragmatic nature of DSM-IV. Nevertheless, these cautions are largely ignored. The DSM is partly responsible. The assertion that the DSM is atheoretical with regard to etiology, although clearly incorrect, tends to generalize to other aspects of the system. Similarly, the emphasis on description that has proved so valuable in improving diagnosis is presented as if clinical description is unencumbered by values and assumptions. Moreover, the failure to state explicitly the assumptions underlying the classification encourages the conclusion that the system is free from theoretical and other influences.In fact the DSM is theory laden. Implicit theoretical models and etiological concepts lie behind many diagnoses, including adjustment, dissociative, and posttraumatic stress disorders. Assumptions about the nature of mental disorders and the way psychopathology is organized underlie the entire system (Livesley and Jackson 1992). Pragmatic and political considerations influenced the final structure. Moreover, as Dr. Sadler and others working on the same issues (Fulford 1989, 1994; Agich 1994) point out, the DSM is also value laden. It is value laden not only in the obvious sense that some diagnostic concepts are highly evaluative or biased against certain groups (Kaplan 1983), but also in the fundamental sense that values are built into the very structure of the system (Agich 1994; Russell 1994; Wakefield 1992).Value influences begin with the definition of mental disorder. As Wakefield (1992) and others have argued, the concept of disorder cannot be value free. Values are also involved in the descriptive terms adopted as diagnostic criteria (Agich 1994) and, as Dr. Sadler convincingly demonstrates, they are intrinsic to the way that the classification is constructed and evaluated—the very aspects of the classification that are generally assumed to be value free. By emphasizing this aspect, Dr. Sadler draws attention to the fact that despite being implicit and informal, these values exert a major influence. They influence kinds of information considered relevant to the classification, the way this information is weighted and evaluated, and the way it is organized into diagnostic concepts. Thus, values shape the classification and the research agenda. This point has not [End Page 223] been fully recognized, or at least not fully acknowledged, by those responsible for developing contemporary classifications. There is a tendency to assume that any values involved in the DSM are largely evaluative and incidental, as if they crept into the system inadvertently due to our limited knowledge. The implication is that their presence is merely a temporary embarrassment to be eliminated automatically as clinical description and phenomenology are refined. But this is not the case; any classification of mental disorders inevitably consists of fact plus value (Fulford 1994). Acknowledgment of the evaluative element does not detract from the achievements of the DSM. It is not a limitation but an essential component.The general failure to attend to the non-factual or non-descriptive aspects of classification means that important aspects of classifications are neglected. The impact of pragmatic considerations, political and economic factors, and ethical and epistemic values on the organization and evaluation of scientific information has not received appropriate attention given the social, clinical, and scientific consequences of contemporary psychiatric classifications. In essence, only a limited aspect of classification has been studied, and even this has been studied in isolation from its context. Under these circumstances there is much to be gained from explicit acknowledgment and analysis of the value component. We are more likely to make progress in resolving nosological issues if we take a broad perspective.For the nosologist, Dr. Sadler makes two useful contributions to understanding the broader view. First, the analysis of value is extended beyond discussion of evaluative or ethical values into a detailed analysis of the epistemic values that... (shrink)

F. H. Bradley did not write extensively or systematically on the philosophy of religion, and much of what he did write has the character of either tentative speculation or the pre-emptive rebuttal of potential misinterpretations that might threaten his general philosophical position. ‘I admit that on this subject I never had much to say’ he warns. But such a remark should not discourage us from considering his views on this topic, since the disclaimer is typically Bradleian, and more reflective of (...) his high standards for what is required in order to claim to have something to say about some matter than of any genuine lack of opinion. On closer inspection we find that he has, scattered throughout his work, a great many important things to say about this subject. (shrink)

W. J. Mander presents a history of metaphysics in nineteenth-century Britain. He traces the story of the development and interplay of three great schools of thought, the agnostics, the empiricists, and the idealists, and their different responses to the idea of an ultimate but unknowable way that things really are in themselves.

This is the first full assessment of British philosophy in the 19th century. Specially written essays by leading experts explore the work of the key thinkers of this remarkable period in intellectual history, covering logic and scientific method, metaphysics, religion, positivism, the impact of Darwin, and ethical, social, and political theory.

We study modal logics in the setting of varieties of modal algebras. Any variety of modal algebras generated by a finite algebra — such, a variety is called tabular — has only finitely many subvarieties, i.e. is of finite height. The converse does not hold in general. It is shown that the converse does hold in the lattice of varieties of K4-algebras. Hence the lower part of this lattice consists of tabular varieties only. We proceed to show that there is (...) a continuum of pretabular varieties of K4-algebras — those are the non-tabular varieties all of whose proper subvarieties are tabular — in contrast with Maksimova's result that there are only five pretabular varieties of S4-algebras. (shrink)

Most of what has been written about Buber and education tend to be studies of two kinds: theoretical studies of his philosophical views on education, and specific case studies that aim at putting theory into practice. The perspective taken has always been to hold a dialogue with Buber's works in order to identify and analyse critically Buber's views and, in some cases, to put them into practice; that is, commentators dialogue with the text. In this article our aims are of (...) a different kind. First and fundamentally, we demonstrate the political and social ontological basis of Buber's thought; that is, we show that Buber, the philosopher of dialogue, held an authentic dialogue with his time, and demonstrate that Buber's work, in this case I and Thou, holds a dialogue with its Zeitgeist; that is the text dialogues with its Zeitgeist. This approach leads us to our second aim, which is to demonstrate that Buber's thought remains relevant to our times, particularly when it serves as a dialogical educational tool with which to resolve conflict of all types and to aid dialogue towards peace in inter-community relations. (shrink)

J. Wackernagel and E. Löfstedt have both drawn attention to Pindar's ‘Neigung, das Futurum zu setzen bei Verben, die eine jetzt vorhandene, aber auf zukünftiges Tun abzielende Willensrichtung ausdrücken’. But they regarded this as a purely grammatical phenomenon, and did not note that the Pindaric use is practically limited to statements of the type, ‘I shall sing, glorify, testify, etc.’. It was E. Bundy who first drew attention to the conventional nature of these futures and so ended years of misunderstanding. (...) So, for example, Wilamowitz considered that P. 1.75 represented an optative with while Slotty, following Breyer, thought that N. 9. 10 was an aorist subjunctive ‘auf Grund des pindarischen Sprachgebrauches’! Postgate, following Gildersleeve, thought that 0. 8. 57 represented though the contrary would appear to be more true, cf. 0. 13. 11: and also Hoekstra sees in the future ‘den Nebenbegriff des Konnens’. (shrink)

Let S denote the variety of Sugihara algebras. We prove that the lattice (K) of subquasivarieties of a given quasivariety K S is finite if and only if K is generated by a finite set of finite algebras. This settles a conjecture by Tokarz [6]. We also show that the lattice (S) is not modular.

Life, work, and influences -- Life -- Work -- Influences -- Metaphysics -- The intelligible world -- The existence of the intelligible world -- The intelligible and the divine world -- The intelligible and the natural world -- Knowledge -- Mind and body -- The souls of animals -- Knowledge : thought and souls -- Knowledge : God -- Mediate knowledge : external world -- Discussion and assessment of Norris's theory -- Was Norris an idealist? -- Faith and reason -- (...) The Socinian controversy -- Faith -- Reason -- Above reason and contrary to reason -- The measure of truth -- Faith and reason -- Malebranche -- Descartes -- Locke -- Love -- The theory of love -- The regulation of love -- The measure of divine love -- Controversy with Locke -- Norris's criticisms of Locke -- Locke's responses -- Concluding comments. (shrink)

W. J. Mander presents the first ever synoptic history of British Idealism, the school of thought which dominated English-language philosophy from the 1860s to the early 20th century. He restores to its proper place this neglected period of philosophy, introducing the exponents of Idealism and explaining its distinctive concepts and doctrines.

This paper argues that a strong thesis of divine providence, whereby God is understood as in complete control of all things, entails pantheism, the thesis that the universe is not ontologically distinct from God. In normal discourse, we distinguish a plan from, on the one hand, the state of affairs which realizes that plan—its execution or expression—and, on the other hand, the person or group whose plan it is. However, with respect to an omnipotent God who displays complete providence, neither (...) of these two distinctions holds. We cannot separate person from plan, or plan from world, and in consequence, neither can we separate person from world, ergo pantheism. Accordingly, the argument of this paper comes in two parts maintaining, first, the impossibility of distinguishing between God’s plan and its execution and, second, the impossibility of distinguishing God himself from his plan. (shrink)

Can poem and picture collaborate successfully in a composite art of text and design? Or does one art inevitably dominate the other? W.J.T. Mitchell maintains that Blake's illuminated poems are an exception to Suzanne Langer's claim that "there are no happy marriages in art—only successful rape." Drawing on over one hundred reproductions of Blake's pictures, this book shows that neither the graphic nor the poetic aspect of his composite art consistently predominates: their relationship is more like an energetic rivalry, a (...) dialogue between vigorously independent modes of expression. W.J.T. Mitchell is Professor of English and Art and Design at the University of Chicago and editor of Critical Inquiry. Originally published in 1978. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

The paper argues that Donnellan’s distinction between the referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions, whilst a genuine feature of language, does not count against Russell’s Theory of Descriptions where Russell’s theory is regarded as a theory of the semantics of descriptions and not the pragmatics of individual uses on a particular occasion. The argument I shall present is simple but decisive and ought to resolve once and for all the debate about the significance of Donnellan’s distinction for Russell’s theory, (...) provided of course that Russell’s theory really does concern the semantics of definite descriptions rather than their use on particular occasions. (shrink)

There exist important deductive systems, such as the non-normal modal logics, that are not proper subjects of classical algebraic logic in the sense that their metatheory cannot be reduced to the equational metatheory of any particular class of algebras. Nevertheless, most of these systems are amenable to the methods of universal algebra when applied to the matrix models of the system. In the present paper we consider a wide class of deductive systems of this kind called protoalgebraic logics. These include (...) almost all (non-pathological) systems of prepositional logic that have occurred in the literature. The relationship between the metatheory of a protoalgebraic logic and its matrix models is studied. The following results are obtained for any finite matrix model U of a filter-distributive protoalgebraic logic : (I) The extension U of is finitely axiomatized (provided has only finitely many inference rules); (II) U has only finitely many extensions. (shrink)

What are the limits of Left Wittgensteinianism's point- and need-based account of conceptual change? Based upon Wittgenstein's account of certainty and the riverbed analogy for conceptual change in On Certainty, the question is raised whether Queloz and Cueni's redevelopment of Left Wittgensteinianism can account for the multiplicitous forms of change these concepts are subject to. I argue that Left Wittgensteinianism can only partially do so, because it overemphasises the role of criticism-driven conceptual change, due to its focus on the reason-based (...) contingency of the practices of a local ‘we’. In response, it is argued that Left Wittgensteinianism should be fortified with (i) gradual changes to concepts' sociocultural constraints that concept-users are unaware of and (ii) evolutionary and environmental changes to the biological determinants of natural constraints of conceptual cores. In the end, there are conceptual practices like holding for certain that are generally, and fully contingent, but simultaneously inevitable not only for ‘us’ but also for many other delimitations of ‘we’. Subsequently, the compatibility of this Wittgensteinian account of conceptual change with pragmatic genealogy is discussed. It is concluded that thinking about conceptual changes to practices cannot be about the possibility of criticism alone nor succeed without the inclusion thereof. (shrink)

In this study, W. J. Waluchow argues that debates between defenders and critics of constitutional bills of rights presuppose that constitutions are more or less rigid entities. Within such a conception, constitutions aspire to establish stable, fixed points of agreement and pre-commitment, which defenders consider to be possible and desirable, while critics deem impossible and undesirable. Drawing on reflections about the nature of law, constitutions, the common law, and what it is to be a democratic representative, Waluchow urges a different (...) theory of bills of rights that is flexible and adaptable. Adopting such a theory enables one not only to answer to critics' most serious challenges, but also to appreciate the role that a bill of rights, interpreted and enforced by unelected judges, can sensibly play in a constitutional democracy. (shrink)